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INTRODUCTION 
In 1971, a young married couple named Judy and Jean Paul Mas discovered that 
their landlord, a man named Oliver Perry, had been secretly watching them through 
two-way mirrors he had installed in their bedroom and bathroom.1 The resulting lit-
igation in federal court ended in victory for the Mas couple. The case, however, has 
interested scholars and teachers of law not for the tort claim on which the couple 
prevailed but because of the contested question of Judy Mas’s domicile. Because the 
case concerned state, not federal, law, the only avenue for federal jurisdiction was 
diversity jurisdiction, and for that to exist, the plaintiffs needed to be “diverse” from 
the defendant—citizens of different states.2 The test in 1971, as it is now, for state 
citizenship for diversity purposes was domicile. Domicile requires more than mere 
residence; a person’s domicile is the last state in which one resided which one in-
tended to make one’s permanent home.3  
In Mas v. Perry, which was litigated in federal district court in Louisiana and then 
appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the defendant, Oliver Perry, was 
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 1. Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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without the other is insufficient. Mere absence from a fixed home, however long continued, 
cannot work the change.” (italics in original)). 
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clearly a domiciliary of Louisiana. Jean Paul Mas was a citizen of France, and thus 
diverse from Perry under the applicable statute.4 The domicile of Judy Mas, however, 
was less clear. There were essentially three roads the court could choose. It could 
hold that she had established her own domicile in Louisiana by moving there for 
graduate school. If that were the case, then she shared the same domicile as Perry, 
and her suit would be dismissed for lack of diversity. Alternatively, it could hold that 
her domicile followed that of her husband, a citizen and domiciliary of France. If that 
were true, then she could not bring the case in federal court, because the federal stat-
ute offered no option for U.S. citizens domiciled abroad. Rather than choose a course 
that would have required dismissal of her suit, the court chose the third way, finding 
that her domicile remained with Mississippi, where she had been born and raised.  
This third way seems obvious in retrospect. Indeed, civil procedure casebooks 
frequently use Mas v. Perry to explain how domicile operates in diversity jurisdiction 
cases.5 But in the moment in which Mas v. Perry was decided, the law was much less 
clear. This Article argues that Mas v. Perry was decided during an important turning 
point in the courts’ use of domicile for a variety of matters, not only federal diversity 
jurisdiction but also state court jurisdiction over other types of cases as well as access 
to state-funded programs such as welfare and in-state tuition. The judges that ad-
dressed Judy Mas’s domicile had to grapple with two important social trends, each 
of which has radically altered the predictability and continuity of people’s lives. As 
the onset of social adulthood began to stretch beyond the teenage years into the 
twenties and thirties, it became more and more difficult for young adults as a group 
to change their domiciles by choosing a new place of permanent residence. Simulta-
neously, the women’s rights movement challenged traditional gender roles, and 
courts began to treat married women as autonomous individuals capable of establish-
ing their own domiciles. Taken together, this Article argues, these two trends under-
mined traditional notions of domicile. The resulting judicial confusion over this doc-
trinal shift is apparent in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Mas v. Perry, and has 
continued to the present day, as courts continue to rely on antiquated notions of the 
capacity required to form the intent to reside somewhere indefinitely. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (conferring diversity jurisdiction on cases involving “citizens 
of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state”). 
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marriages, spouses do not always share their partners’ domicile and the modern cases so re-
flect”). But see BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK, TONI M. MASSARO & NORMAN W. SPAULDING, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES & PROBLEMS 235–37 (5th ed. 2013) (reprinting Mas v. Perry and 
discussing married women’s domicile). 
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Judy and Jean Paul Mas brought their suit during a time of upheaval and change 
in the social and economic significance of gender and young adulthood. The case 
illustrates the emergence of these changes and the way in which they have under-
mined the usefulness of domicile as a legal tool. In this Article, we engage in a close 
reading of the Mas case and use it as an entry point to a broader exploration of the 
dismantling of domicile as a coherent legal concept that has occurred in the decades 
since. Ultimately, we conclude that two factors—the move toward gender equality 
and the increasingly delayed attainment of social adulthood—have rendered young 
Americans incapable of establishing domicile as traditionally defined, which has in 
turn rendered domicile an ineffective tool for determining state citizenship and legal 
status for a large segment of the population.  
Traditionally, a person’s domicile determined his or her state citizenship. Domi-
cile was the place of a person’s “true, fixed, and permanent home and principal es-
tablishment, and to which he has the intention of returning whenever he is absent 
therefrom.”6 Thus, domicile differed from mere residence. A person could obtain 
domicile the very day of a move to a new state, provided the proper mental state of 
“intent to remain indefinitely” existed; however, absent that intent, that same person 
would retain her old domicile, despite having changed her physical residence. Today, 
as numerous scholars have examined in great detail, domicile is still used to deter-
mine access to many privileges and rights—just like in the Mas litigation, domicile 
still determines one’s right to bring a diversity action in federal court, but also the 
right to bring a case for divorce or paternity in a state court, or even eligibility for 
Social Security Survivor’s benefits.7 In contrast, states have largely moved away 
from domicile in favor of residence to determine state citizenship for voting rights, 
the right to run for office, and the ability to obtain a driver’s license.8 These changes, 
we argue, reflect the difficulty of using an intent-based test in an era of 
impermanence. 
Under the traditional rules, not everyone could determine his or her own domicile. 
Children, for example, took on the domicile of their parents.9 Under the “derivative 
domicile” rule, women took on the domicile of their husbands.10 And even those who 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399 (quoting Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954)). 
 7. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender, 47 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1453, 1470–75 (2014) (discussing contemporary applications of domicile); 
William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
1371 (2012) (explaining use of domicile in determining applicable state law); Ann Laquer 
Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
381 (2007) (discussing history of domicile and divorce jurisdiction); Jill Elaine Hasday, 
Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998) (describing the do-
mestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction); Judith B. Resnik, “Naturally” Without 
Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1714 (1991) 
(discussing frequency of diversity jurisdiction in federal cases). 
 8. Willis L.M. Reese & Robert S. Green, That Elusive Word, “Residence,” 6 VAND. L. 
REV. 561, 562 n.4, 571–74 (1953). 
 9. Prentiss v. Barton, 19 F. Cas. 1276, 1277 (C.C.D. Va. 1819) (No. 11,384) (“By the 
general laws of the civilized world, the domicil of the parents at the time of birth, or what is 
termed the ‘domicil of origin,’ constitutes the domicil of an infant, and continues, until aban-
doned, or until the acquisition of a new domicil, in a different place.”). 
 10. See infra Part I.B. 
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were capable of establishing a new domicile had to pass a strict test to do so, as a 
person maintained his or her original domicile until taking on a new one. This change 
required much more than simply moving to a new place; the person had to show that 
he or she did not intend to return permanently to the former domicile and in fact 
intended to make the new place his or her “permanent home.” As a result, the domi-
cile of a person’s birth or childhood could in theory remain that person’s domicile 
long after leaving home.11  
Domicile has always been a legal fiction; it has never perfectly described how 
people actually live. But this Article argues that in the last fifty years, the legal fiction 
of domicile has become increasingly unmoored from the reality of people’s lives. 
This change has less to do with increased mobility—although for some social classes, 
mobility has increased—and more to do with two factors that we think have been 
unappreciated in legal scholarship. The first is the rise of gender equality. As women 
entered the workforce in increasing numbers and gained access to higher education, 
their mobility and autonomy increased. Simultaneously, they began to delay mar-
riage, or to forego marriage altogether, and those who were married were less likely 
to reflexively adopt their husband’s domicile and were more inclined to make domi-
ciliary choices for themselves and their families. This put the derivative domicile 
rule under pressure, and the result has been a softening of the rule, where marriage 
is a factor in determining domicile for both men and women but no longer the sole 
determinant for either.12 The second is the increasingly long time it takes young 
adults to become financially and emotionally self-sufficient and independent from 
their parents. This so-called phenomenon of “emerging adulthood,” identified by 
psychologists as a new phase of life that sometimes lasts into a person’s thirties, has 
made it more difficult for young adults to establish a new domicile. Courts—includ-
ing the court in Mas v. Perry—have thus increasingly relied upon a person’s domicile 
of origin in making these determinations, even where there is little chance that the 
party will ever return there. Because of these two trends, the concept of domicile is 
no longer capable of doing the legal work it is supposed to do. 
Domicile has survived two sets of attacks in the last fifty years, the first occurring 
during the inception of “interest analysis” in conflict of laws scholarship,13 and the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See White v. Tennant, 8 S.E. 596 (W.Va. 1888). 
 12. For a more detailed history of changes in the derivative domicile rule, see Kerry 
Abrams, Citizen Spouse, 101 CAL. L. REV. 407 (2013). 
 13. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 
MICH. L. REV. 392, 408–10 (1980); John Bernard Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: 
The Dubious Dominance of Domicile, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 651, 665 (1983). But see Brainerd 
Currie & Herma Hill Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: 
Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of 
Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. 
L. REV. 249, 255, 261–70 (1992). Diversity jurisdiction itself has also survived extensive criti-
cal scorn. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 
231, 236–37 (1976) (advocating abolition of diversity jurisdiction); Henry J. Friendly, The 
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 510 (1928) (same); David L. 
Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 319 
(1977) (advocating that Congress adopt a “local option” plan, under which each federal district 
court would have freedom to curtail diversity jurisdiction in its own court). But see John P. 
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second arising from the problems domicile-based citizenship caused for married 
same-sex couples14 prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges.15 
But the incoherence of domicile as a concept in the complicated twenty-first century 
leads us to question its ongoing viability, not only for same-sex couples but more 
broadly. This Article joins the growing number of voices questioning traditional 
domicile rules by returning to the seminal Mas v. Perry case and identifying two 
strands of judicial reasoning in the case—anxiety about the derivative domicile rule 
resulting from increasing gender equality and a renewed reliance on a party’s child-
hood domicile, even when the party has moved away and has no intention of return-
ing home. Domicile may have made sense as a basis for jurisdiction in an era when 
adulthood began at twenty-one. Today, however, habitual residence is proving to be 
a more satisfying means of determining membership in a particular state or commu-
nity. This standard is increasingly being adopted internationally, and we argue that it 
would make better sense for determining access to federal court under diversity ju-
risdiction or state courts for other matters than domicile currently does.16 
Part I of this Article discusses the legal and factual background of Mas v. Perry. 
This narrative reveals how the case reflects both the changes in American society 
that were beginning to occur at that time and the struggle of the concept of domicile 
to keep pace with those changes. Part II traces the development of the fundamental 
shift in gender roles that began several years before Mas was decided. This section 
argues that the growing number of women attending college, embarking upon ca-
reers, and forming two-career marriages increased the difficulty of measuring domi-
cile, while undermining the efficacy of a gendered presumption such as the one em-
bedded in the derivative domicile rule.  
As Part III will demonstrate, these changes in gender norms occurred in tandem 
with broader changes in the lives of young Americans. Even as the legal age of ma-
jority decreased in the early seventies, the actual age at which young people began 
to reach the markers of adulthood began to increase. Both women and men began to 
seek higher education, to delay marriage, and to wait longer to establish homes, fami-
lies, and careers—and, consequently, to establish any permanent intentions regarding 
domicile. This newfound period of “emerging adulthood” served to further under-
mine the usefulness of domicile as a legal tool.  
Part IV shows how the new legal age of majority, in combination with shrinking 
state budgets and the articulation of the right to interstate travel, led to a new focus 
on the legality of tuition residency requirements. It demonstrates that although the 
Supreme Court struck down durational residency requirements in other areas of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7 (1963) (opposing 1968 
American Law Institute proposal to curtail diversity jurisdiction). 
 14. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 12, at 429–42; Appleton, supra note 7, at 1468–69; 
Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum 
Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1678–79 (2011). 
 15. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Because they were married in one state but not another, domi-
cile often played a decisive role in determining whether same-sex couples could obtain federal 
benefits, or even whether they could divorce. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2685–96 (2013) (federal benefits); Abrams, supra note 12, at 434–38 (divorce). 
 16. For a discussion of how habitual residence is being used internationally, see C.M.V. 
CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 229–30 (4th ed. 2011). 
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law, it maintained a dismissive attitude toward student capacity to form domiciliary 
intent. This attitude, however, did little to stem the wave of litigation that began in 
the 1960s and has continued into the present day. The cases decided during this pe-
riod of litigation reveal the interaction of gender changes, emerging adulthood, and 
domicile.  
The Article concludes that the confusion over domicile that has emerged in the 
last fifty years makes it an increasingly unwieldy and unhelpful legal concept. As 
university regulations and the courts’ convoluted and conflicting reasoning demon-
strate, the changes that developed during the era of Mas v. Perry and continued into 
the present day have made it difficult, if not impossible, to measure domiciliary intent 
in any consistent, equitable, or meaningful way. Using residence, or residence with 
additional requirements, is a more sensible and accurate way to handle jurisdictional 
questions. 
I. THE MOMENT OF MAS V. PERRY 
Our story begins with the case of Mas v. Perry, perhaps the most famous domicile 
case and a frequent excerpt in civil procedure and choice of law casebooks. The Mas 
case, we argue, highlights the important changes in gender relations and social adult-
hood that were occurring during the early 1970s. Its convoluted jurisdictional rea-
soning reflects judicial confusion over how to understand the ability of married 
women and adult students to form domiciliary intent—a confusion that is unresolved 
today.  
A. The Hole in the Wall 
Judith (“Judy”) Russell Mas was born in Atlanta and grew up and attended college 
in Jackson, Mississippi.17 She met Jean Paul Mas, a French citizen,18 upon moving 
to Baton Rouge to pursue her graduate studies in French. In November of 1970, they 
were married at Judy’s parents’ home in Jackson, and then returned to Baton Rouge 
to resume their studies and their positions as teaching assistants at Louisiana State 
University (LSU).19 Judy also taught part time at a local elementary school.20 At the 
time of their marriage, Judy was twenty-two, and Jean Paul was approaching thirty.21 
In many ways, Judy’s life reflected the changing gender norms of the decade. She 
was a young bride, but one who was pursuing a high level of education alongside her 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Answer to Interrogatories Propounded to Complainants by Defendant at 1–2, Mas v. 
Perry, No. 71-114 (E.D. La. May 31, 1972), aff’d, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974) [hereinafter 
Interrogatory Answers].  
 18. He had only been in the United States for about a year, meaning he was not yet eligible 
to file for citizenship. Trial of the Merits at 102:10–15, Mas v. Perry, No. 71-114 (M.D. La. 
Aug. 15, 1973) [hereinafter Trial Transcript] (testimony of Jean Paul Mas).  
 19. Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 95:15–20, 96:15–22 (testimony of Jean Paul Mas).  
 20. Trial Transcript, supra note 18, 105:10–15 (testimony of Judy Mas); Deposition of 
Dr. Curtis Steele at 22:1–3, Mas, No. 71-114 (M.D. La. June 22, 1972) [hereinafter Steele 
Deposition].  
 21. Trial Transcript, supra note 18, 114:13–14 (testimony of Judy Mas).  
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husband.22 She did not abandon her career upon her marriage to become a 
homemaker; rather, she and Jean Paul both continued to pursue their careers. More-
over, her pursuit of higher education, and particularly of a graduate degree, reflected 
the changing ideas of adulthood that began to emerge in the 1970s. She, like many 
other young Americans, was pursuing a longer course of education, thereby delaying 
some of the traditional markers of adulthood, such as marriage, children, or financial 
self-sufficiency.23 
Upon returning to Baton Rouge, Judy and Jean Paul moved into an apartment in 
a converted single-family home owned by Oliver Perry, a man in his forties who 
owned several apartment buildings in the city.24 The house had been subdivided into 
three apartments, one that Perry rented to the Mases, one that he rented to two single 
female students, and the third of which Perry testified he was in the process of reno-
vating to make it rentable.25 The two finished apartments were divided by a walled-
off hallway and by the unfinished apartment.26 Each of the apartments contained 
several mirrors, which, it turned out, were no ordinary mirrors but were “two-way” 
mirrors that allowed someone in the sealed-off hallway or unfinished apartment to 
observe what was happening in the occupied apartments.27  
The Mases did not suspect that the mirrors in their apartment were being used to 
spy on them. Instead, it was their neighbors, Linda Bourgeois and Colleen Pilley, 
also students, who made the discovery. When the young women initially rented the 
apartment, Mr. Perry came by and insisted on installing mirrors. According to testi-
mony at trial, “He said young girls like to look pretty and . . . look in the mirrors.”28 
Linda Bourgeois’s mother, who was with the young women when they rented the 
apartment, testified that she told Perry that additional mirrors were unnecessary.29 
Nevertheless, the next time she visited them, a new mirror had been installed in the 
living room, which one of the women was using as bedroom.30  
Colleen and Linda didn’t like the mirror, so they covered it with the largest poster 
they could find—a picture of the actor Robert Redford.31 At trial, Linda Bourgeois 
testified that when Perry arrived to pick up their rent check he asked “if we like[d] 
Robert Redford better than the mirror and I said yes.”32 At the time, Redford had just 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. In 1960, the median age of marriage was twenty-two for men and twenty for women. 
By 2009, the median age at marriage was twenty-eight for men and twenty-six for women. 
Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil Recognition of 
Adolescent Marriage, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1817, 1834–36 (2012). 
 23. See id. at 1835 (describing how the national median marital age began to rise as 
“[m]ore young people began staying in school into their early and mid-twenties to complete 
their educations, and more postponed marriage and parenthood”).  
 24. Interrogatory Answers, supra note 17, at 1; see also Trial Transcript, supra note 18, 
at 76:2–4 (testimony of Officer John J. Landry).  
 25. Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 8:4–12 (testimony of Oliver B. Perry).  
 26. Id. at 8:13–22. 
 27. Id. at 47:21–48:22 (testimony of Officer Kenneth C. Hanson). 
 28. Id. at 14:18–19 (testimony of Mary Louise Bourgeois). 
 29. Id. at 14:19–22. 
 30. Id. at 15:2–9. 
 31. Id. at 15:17–18; id. at 39:14–20 (testimony of Colleen Pilley Melancon).  
 32. Id. at 26:21–22 (testimony of Linda Bourgeois); see also id. at 39:21–40:2 (testimony 
of Colleen Pilley Melancon).  
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starred in the hit film Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid,33 which made him a 
major star, and was likely the subject of the poster the young women used to cover 
the mirror. In that film, Redford and his co-star Paul Newman portrayed members of 
the “Hole-In-The-Wall-Gang”—a coincidence likely lost on the young women, who 
were completely unaware that they were using the poster to obstruct a hole in their wall. 
One day, Bourgeois’s fiancé and Pilley’s boyfriend were visiting the apartment, 
and Bourgeois’s fiancé commented that one of the mirrors “looked funny,”34 “like a 
two-way mirror.”35 According to Linda, he used a penny to unscrew “the little plastic 
things that hold them on.”36 On the other side of the mirror was a hole in the wall, 
covered with paneling, which led to the unoccupied apartment.37 The students called 
the police, who arrived and took down the bedroom mirror as well.38 Behind that 
mirror they found a door that opened into the closed-off hallway, and in the hallway 
were other doors, unlocked, leading to two-way mirrors installed in the bathroom 
and bedroom of the apartment rented by Judy and Jean Paul Mas.39 Several witnesses 
testified that they could see clearly through the mirrors into the Mas apartment.40 A 
police officer also testified that he found cigarette butts in the empty apartment, from 
which he concluded “someone had definitely or probably been standing there looking 
through the mirror smoking cigarettes and putting them out on the floor.”41 The po-
lice investigation revealed that the cigarettes were the same type Perry smoked.42 In 
a nearby closet in the vacant apartment, police found pornographic magazines, a pil-
low, sheets, and a bedspread.43 Police then searched all of the other apartments 
owned by Perry in Baton Rouge and discovered at least one other building in which 
two-way mirrors had been installed, as well as a hole cut in the wall of yet another.44  
Judy Mas was home the day the mirrors were discovered, taking a nap after re-
turning from a visit to the dentist. A knock on the door awoke her, and two policemen 
entered and told her that she “had better sit down, that [she] was being watched.”45 
Judy immediately drove to LSU and came back to the apartment with Jean Paul. 
When they arrived, the police were still there.46 
Jean Paul and Judy Mas appear to have responded to the incident very differently. 
Jean Paul was initially angry, and stayed angry. At trial, he testified, “I was shocked. 
I could not believe it could happen. And then I was very angry, very angry.”47 He 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE KID (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1969).  
 34. Id. at 28:21–22 (testimony of Linda Bourgeois). 
 35. Id. at 40:14–15 (testimony of Collen Pilley Melancon).  
 36. Id. at 28:25–29:5 (testimony of Linda Bourgeois). 
 37. Id. at 29:13–15. 
 38. Id. at 29:16-24. 
 39. Id. at 29:20–24; id. at 50:4–13 (testimony of Officer Kenneth C. Hanson). 
 40. Id. at 43:14–23 (testimony of Colleen Pilley Melancon); id. at 50:6–25 (testimony of 
Officer Kenneth C. Hanson). 
 41. Id. at 54:14–16 (testimony of Officer Kenneth C. Hanson). 
 42. Id. at 73:5–21 (testimony of Officer John J. Landry). 
 43. Id. at 74:6–10. 
 44. Id. at 78:10–81:5. 
 45. Id. at 106:13–17 (testimony of Judy Mas). 
 46. Id. at 106:24–107:3. 
 47. Id. at 100:3–4 (testimony of Jean Paul Mas). 
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apparently continued to be angry for months after the incident, with a desire to seek 
revenge on Perry, so much so that Judy’s psychiatrist, a Dr. Steele, felt that Jean Paul 
was hindering her recovery. Jean Paul, unlike his wife, did not seek psychiatric 
treatment.48  
In contrast to Jean Paul’s anger, Judy Mas’s reaction was fear and shame. She was 
convinced that Perry had brought others to the vacant apartment to view her, includ-
ing a man with a black mustache whom she had seen one day exiting the vacant 
apartment just after she had taken a bath. She testified that the man, accompanied by 
Perry, “just looked at me, all the way out to the truck, and I could not understand it. 
I remember thinking at the time that maybe my robe was opened. I looked down real 
quick to see and it was not.”49 She was afraid to stay in the apartment, could not 
undress near mirrors, and was convinced that male members of her French classes at 
LSU had watched her while she was in the bathroom or in her bedroom with her 
husband.50 After some time, she sought psychiatric treatment on the advice of her 
lawyer.51  
During litigation, Judy’s psychiatrist, Dr. Steele, opined that “[s]he was raised in 
a strict, authoritarian, fundamentalist tradition and she is breaking from that tradition 
in a more open style of living. She has a good deal of guilt about doing so. Her guilt 
was thrown into the open by having been observed doing (forbidden) sexual prac-
tices.”52 Dr. Steele also testified that he “became aware of her husband functioning 
as an agitator restoring the issues again and again” and concluded that her husband 
played a large role in “pushing her anger.”53 Both testified that the trauma of the 
incident negatively affected their marriage.54 
A few months after the incident, the Mases filed suit against Perry in the federal 
court for the Middle District of Louisiana, alleging that Perry had committed a tort 
under Louisiana law by violating their right to privacy and seeking damages of 
$100,000 each.55 Judy and Jean Paul each testified to the trauma they suffered as a 
result of Perry’s actions. In his closing argument, the Mases’ lawyer emphasized the 
trauma experienced by Judy Mas and described Jean Paul’s claim for relief as flow-
ing from Judy’s pain. The injury suffered by Judy, as characterized by her counsel, 
was of an intimate nature that only a woman would understand: 
I’m a man, I don’t know what it would do to me. I could figure out pretty 
much what it would do to my wife. I would ask you ladies on this jury, 
you will know more than the gentlemen on this jury what this would do 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Id. at 100:17–18; id. at 132:7–13 (testimony of Dr. Curtis Steele); Steele Deposition, 
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to a woman. I have no way of knowing, I have no way of telling you what 
would go through a girl’s mind at a time like this.56 
In contrast, the injury suffered by Jean Paul was based entirely on how his wife’s 
pain affected him. Counsel was not clear whether Jean Paul’s injury was the decline 
in his own sexual satisfaction due to the trauma to his wife or rather an injury to his 
property; both possibilities were suggested: 
Jean Paul Mas, like I said, he is a man. A man would not be bothered as 
much by this and if he were just a man with some woman and found out 
there was a two-way mirror, he could forget it, but he is her husband. It 
hurt him, his wife. It hurt a marriage. It hurt the husband.57 
The jury appears to have followed this lead, rendering a verdict of $15,000 in 
favor of Judy and only $5000 for Jean Paul.58 Perry appealed, hiring a new lawyer—
a woman—to represent him.59 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the verdict, and the United 
States Supreme Court declined to hear the case. 
B. The Problem of Intent 
The close tie between Judy and Jean Paul’s tort claims was echoed by the court’s 
analysis of diversity jurisdiction. The Mases premised their suit on the presence of 
diversity jurisdiction, albeit without alleging any facts pertaining to that jurisdic-
tion.60 In order for a federal court to hear a case that does not involve federal claims, 
the parties must be “diverse”; in other words, no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same 
state as any defendant.61 Courts determine citizenship for purposes of diversity juris-
diction using the concept of “domicile”—one’s “true, fixed, and permanent home 
and principal establishment,” to which one “has the intention of returning whenever 
he is absent therefrom.”62  
In the Mas litigation, the issue of diversity jurisdiction turned on the question of 
Judy Mas’s domicile. Jean Paul was still a citizen of France, and Perry was un-
contestably domiciled in Louisiana. That meant that Jean Paul could sue Perry in 
federal court, because the parties were diverse. But Judy Mas’s domicile was less 
clear. In an earlier era, she would likely have been deemed a citizen of France by the 
simple fact of her marriage to Jean Paul.63 By the 1970s, U.S. women were no longer 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 146:20–25 (closing statement of Whalen, attorney 
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expatriated upon marrying a foreign citizen,64 but a domestic version of “derivative 
domicile” still prevailed. Under the “derivative domicile” rule, a woman gained her 
husband’s domicile by operation of law.65 This “patriarchal rule,” which “epitomized 
married women’s more general subordination,” was still widely in effect at the time 
of Judy Mas’s suit.66 In some cases, the legal rule could mean that a woman would 
be domiciled in a place where she had never actually set foot, so long as her husband 
had retained his domicile there.67 Although neither the district nor the circuit courts 
made a determination of Jean Paul’s domicile (as under the statute, his citizenship in 
France—not his domicile—was determinative for diversity jurisdiction), they treated 
him as though France was his domicile in considering application of the derivative 
domicile rule. In Judy Mas’s case, the consequences if she were found to be domi-
ciled in France were particularly harsh: the statute did not provide a mechanism for 
a U.S. citizen, domiciled in a foreign country, to sue in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction. Only citizens of foreign countries, or citizens of the United States, domi-
ciled in a state, were entitled to do so. Legal unity with her husband would destroy 
Judy Mas’s case; for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, she would have no 
citizenship. 
 Probably with this idea in mind, Perry contested the existence of diversity juris-
diction as the parties approached trial.68 In a summary pretrial order, however, the 
court rejected Perry’s claim and provided a rationale for diversity jurisdiction, stating 
that the couple had “contend[ed] that Jean Paul Mas [was] a citizen of France, and 
his wife, Judy Mas, was a citizen of the State of Mississippi at the time of their mar-
riage.”69 This determination gave no consideration to the relevant factors surround-
ing Judy’s domicile (such as whether she had an intent to remain in Louisiana, or 
whether the derivative domicile rule—which was alive and well in both Louisiana 
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 68. Pre-Trial Order at 1, Mas v. Perry, No. 71-114 (M.D. La. May 10, 1973), aff’d, 489 
F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974).  
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and Mississippi70—applied to her). Moreover, even if the event of marriage had not 
changed her domicile, many factors beyond her marriage pointed towards a possible 
change in domicile.  
Despite the court’s pretrial order, Perry’s attorney continued to dispute Judy 
Mas’s domicile. When Judy took the stand at trial, Perry’s attorney asked whether 
she was required to pay nonresident tuition at LSU.71 This question highlights the 
link between domicile and residency determinations for tuition purposes and hints at 
the changes that were taking place in the realm of higher education at the time.72 The 
judge responded that, if the question was aimed at contesting jurisdiction, there was 
“no question” that the court had jurisdiction, but he allowed the question.73 Judy 
answered that she had paid no tuition at all due to her job as a teaching assistant.74 
Whether, without the graduate stipend she received, LSU would have classified her 
as an in-state or out-of-state student was never determined at trial. 
After Judy Mas concluded her testimony, Perry moved for dismissal of her case, 
alleging that she had failed to establish diversity of citizenship with Perry.75 Again, 
the judge rejected the argument out of hand. He reasoned that “as far as Mrs. Mas 
[was] concerned, the evidence [was] very clear that she [was] from out of state” and 
was simply in the state “temporarily” to study and teach.76 The judge did not elabo-
rate on the details of this “clear” evidence, instead stating only that “[t]here [was] no 
indication that there was any intention [by the Mases] to make Baton Rouge their 
permanent home” and moreover that the complaint’s allegations that the Mases were 
citizens of France and Mississippi, respectively, were sufficient.77 Nor did he cite 
any legal rule that students cannot obtain domicile in the place where they study, 
although, as we shall see, such a rule did develop in the decades following Mas v. 
Perry.78 
In this way, the judge skirted the issue of derivative domicile, but raised other 
issues related to domiciliary intent. In effect, he substituted one domiciliary presump-
tion, based on stereotypes about gendered relationships in marriage, for another, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. See Welch v. Lewis, 184 F. Supp. 806, 808 (N.D. Miss. 1960) (“It is well settled under 
Mississippi law that when a woman marries, her domicile, and thereafter her legal residence, 
becomes that of her husband.”); Juneau v. Juneau, 80 So. 2d 864, 867 (La. 1955) (“The courts 
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an's domicile is that of her husband, she may establish a separate domicile if she is abandoned 
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 71. Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 118:6–7 (testimony of Judy Mas). 
 72. See infra Part IV. 
 73. Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 118:10–14 (testimony of Judy Mas).  
 74. Id. at 118:15–19.  
 75. Id. at 120:1–5 (statement of Avant, attorney for Oliver Perry). He also moved for 
dismissal based on “the failure of the Plaintiff to establish the necessary jurisdictional amount 
as far as the Plaintiff Jean Paul Mas is concerned.” Id. at 120:5–7. 
 76. Id. at 120:22–25 (statement of Hon. E. Gordon West).  
 77. Id. at 121:11–15.  
 78. See infra Part IV. 
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based on stereotypes of students and their ties to home.79 Earlier in the trial, Judy 
Mas confirmed that she “had no intention of returning to the home [in Mississippi] 
to reside with [her] parents any longer.”80 The judge, however, ignored both Judy’s 
stated intent and the traditional idea that marriage severs a person from parental ties. 
Until the early 1970s, most young adults were deemed minors until the age of twenty-
one.81 Upon the event of marriage, however, they were viewed as legal adults, re-
gardless of their age.82 In fact, Judy was past the age of majority and had moved to 
Louisiana even before meeting and marrying Jean Paul, meaning that actions sepa-
rate from and in addition to her marriage demonstrated her intent to form an inde-
pendent legal identity and life. The judge, however, continued to identify her with 
her childhood home, despite her departure from her home and her subsequent mar-
riage. The arguments of Judy’s own lawyer may have contributed to this identifica-
tion of Judy as linked to her childhood home rather than as an autonomous adult, as 
he consistently referred to her as a “little girl” whose upbringing had predisposed her 
to react with shock and horror to the discovery of Perry’s violations.83 
Moreover, the judge’s reasoning implied that, as a student, Judy could not have 
any intent of making Louisiana her “permanent home.”84 Indeed, Judy and Jean Paul 
had moved to Illinois sometime after filing the suit.85 They testified that they in-
tended to return to Baton Rouge so that Jean Paul could get his PhD at LSU,86 but 
Jean Paul also stated that, after receiving his PhD, he was unsure where he would 
receive a position. “I don’t know where I can get a position in this country. Maybe 
in Chicago or New York City or whatsoever,” he stated.87  
The couple’s mobility, fueled largely by Jean Paul’s career aspirations, illumi-
nates the changes occurring among the young adult population. Although the Mases 
were married and even had their first child sometime after filing suit against Perry, 
they were not settled in one place or planning to be for some time. This mobility 
perhaps made them incapable of considering a single state as their “permanent 
home,” leading the judge to identify Judy’s domicile as the one place she emphati-
cally did not intend to make her home—Mississippi.  
The trial judge could have ended his analysis with his determination that Judy 
retained her Mississippi domicile because she had not acquired another. But he did 
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400 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:387 
 
not; he seemed compelled to also address the issue of derivative domicile. Even if, 
he stated, Judy had established the intent to remain in Louisiana, it “is hard for me to 
think that she can be a resident of any place other than her husband [sic].”88 Jean Paul 
was clearly not domiciled in Mississippi, so it is unclear how this statement fit with 
the judge’s prior determination that Judy was domiciled there. The judge did not 
attempt to reconcile these statements; rather, he simply stated that if Judy could be 
deemed a resident of Louisiana, he would still assume the court had jurisdiction over 
her claims, “ancillary” to her husband’s case.89 The judge did not take this argument 
to its logical conclusion: if Judy Mas’s domicile was in France, then she was not 
diverse with Perry because she was neither a citizen of a different state nor a 
noncitizen under the statute.90 
Because the trial court failed to adequately justify its jurisdiction over Judy Mas, 
Perry had a convenient legal hook on which to hang his appeal. After the jury found 
in favor of Judy and Jean Paul, Perry promptly appealed to the Fifth Circuit,91 and 
when he lost on appeal, he filed an unsuccessful petition for rehearing. Although his 
attorney could have argued for application of the rule of derivative domicile as a 
means of demonstrating incomplete diversity, Perry failed to make such a claim. Per-
haps his lawyer feared that the rule might be constitutionally suspect in an era in 
which the Supreme Court was striking down legal classifications based on gender,92 
or perhaps there was an absence of precedent with which to make that argument. 
Instead, Perry’s appeal focused on the trial judge’s assertion that Judy’s student sta-
tus implied an absence of intent to make Louisiana her domicile.93 Perry argued that 
students were in fact capable of forming a domicile in the state where they attended 
school.94 In this way, his brief reflects the ongoing shifts in young adulthood and 
higher education that were occurring at the time of the case. Furthermore, his argu-
ments depicted Judy as an autonomous individual, one whose domicile was not de-
fined solely by the fact of her marriage or her parents’ residence. In these ways, 
Perry’s petition for appeal reflected new ideas of gender equality. 
The Fifth Circuit opinion, however, largely ignored any questions of student sta-
tus or burden of proof, and did not rely on the notion that women could have auton-
omy within marriage. Instead, the court focused on Judy’s domicile in the context of 
her relationship with Jean Paul. The court reasoned that the derivative domicile rule 
was premised on “the theoretical identity of person and interest of the married 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Id. at 121:16–19 (statement of Hon. E. Gordon West).  
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couple.”95 If Judy were domiciled in France due to her marriage to Jean Paul, then 
she would not be a domiciliary of any U.S. state, so she could not sue as a U.S. citizen 
diverse from Perry. Yet she was not an alien, so she could not sue under the portion 
of the statue that provided jurisdiction over suits brought by foreign nationals against 
U.S. citizens. Thus, a finding that her domicile followed her husband’s would render 
her a “jurisdictional zero.”96 Such a finding would work “curious” and “absurd re-
sults on the facts” of the case.97 
 On the other hand, if the court found that Judy were domiciled in Louisiana, she 
would not be able to join this diversity suit with her husband because she would not 
be diverse to the defendant. In either case, the “identity of person and interest of the 
married couple” would be destroyed.98 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit refused to in-
voke the derivative domicile rule, but only as a means of furthering the gendered 
policy—unity of husband and wife—behind the rule. To deny diversity jurisdiction 
would be to deny the right of the married couple to bring suit together in federal 
court, frustrating the idea that husband and wife were “one.”  
The Fifth Circuit also appeared to endorse the trial court’s concept of a kind of 
“ancillary jurisdiction” linking Judy and Jean Paul’s claims. The court stated that its 
jurisdiction stood “on two separate legs of diversity jurisdiction: a claim by an alien 
against a State citizen; and an action between citizens of different States.”99 The court 
then circled back to “the propriety of having the federal district court entertain a 
spouse’s action against a defendant, where the district court already has jurisdiction 
over a claim, arising from the same transaction, by the other spouse against the same 
defendant.”100 Like the lower court, the Fifth Circuit invoked an idea of ancillary 
jurisdiction, and then went one step further to explicitly root that jurisdiction in a 
unitary theory of marriage. The court failed to fully analyze the relevant facts in any 
detail. Instead, the court essentially decided that there was diversity as between Judy 
Mas and Perry because of the propriety of entertaining both spouses’ actions in one 
case, without really examining any decisive facts on that issue. This linkage may 
have been especially salient given the facts of the Mas v. Perry case, where Jean 
Paul’s claim was largely dependent on the emotional distress of his wife. Ironically, 
in order for Jean Paul to make his largely derivative tort claim, his wife had to invoke 
derivative domicile.  
Rather than signaling the “death-knell” to the patriarchal rule of derivative domi-
cile, then, the Fifth Circuit treated Judy as simultaneously wifely and childlike. The 
court tied her to both her husband and her parents: in order to preserve the unity of 
her marriage for purposes of the litigation, she retained the domicile of her parents 
and childhood home. Using this logic, the Fifth Circuit preserved the vision of female 
identity as defined by first a woman’s parents and then by her husband.  
Judy Mas’s situation appears to have befuddled both the trial and appellate courts 
in her case because her actions flouted the social norms of the time. She was married 
but still pursuing higher education and a career, had moved to a new state but did not 
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appear to know where she would end up next, and expressed uncertainty of what her 
future would bring. The one thing she did seem sure of was the fact that she would 
never return to Mississippi. Because she seemed incapable of forming another fixed 
domiciliary intent, however, the court linked her to Mississippi and to the legal status 
of her childhood. 
Social norms, regardless of what the Mas v. Perry judges thought, were changing. 
These changes, which were well on their way in the early 1970s but have continued 
to develop in subsequent decades, have rendered the concept of domicile even more 
confusing and inaccurate than it was in Mas v. Perry. When both young women and 
young men take longer to finish their education, move more frequently for school 
and employment, and reject traditional gender norms, the traditional concept of 
domicile and particularly of derivative domicile based on marriage or parentage be-
comes far more difficult to apply in any consistent and meaningful way. Furthermore, 
individuals such as Judy Mas may not be in a position to form domicile in the tradi-
tional sense, as they have no sense of where they will remain indefinitely, especially 
in their twenties. The fluidity of their lives clashes with the rigidity of domicile, ren-
dering domicile incapable of accurately measuring and reflecting their intent and 
their lives.  
II. THE RISE OF GENDER EQUALITY 
Mas v. Perry was decided amidst a revolution in sexual behavior and gender 
norms, and the case reflects this time of transition and shifting social mores. As these 
changes developed, they contributed to the confused and contested use of domicile. 
In particular, the increase in the number of highly educated women, the shift toward 
a more equitable legal understanding of marriage, and the corresponding rise of two-
career marriages made the notion of a single fixed domicile, shared by all members 
of a family, far less reflective of the realities of many people’s lives.  
A. The Gender Revolution of the Seventies  
During the decades leading up to the 1960s and 1970s, women and men operated 
in separate spheres.101 Men were expected to work outside the home to support their 
families, while women were understood to belong within the home, raising children 
and engaging in other domestic activities—even though they, too, often worked for 
wages outside it.102 Under common law, women could marry earlier than men, re-
flecting the idea that men needed additional years of training and education to be able 
to support a family, whereas women simply needed to find a husband.103 These rigid 
gender roles permeated American society. The nation’s highest Court even sanc-
tioned the idea that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] 
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.”104 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ 
Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1093–94 (1994). 
 102. Id. at 1116. 
 103. See Miriam Aberg, Patricia Small & J. Allen Watson, Males, Fathers and Husbands: 
Changing Roles and Reciprocal Legal Rights, 26 FAM. COORDINATOR 327, 328 (1977). 
 104. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
2017] DOMICILE DISMANTLED  403 
 
The late 1960s and early 1970s, however, witnessed a “revived and burgeoning 
feminist movement” and drastic changes in the “life patterns of women.”105 The per-
centage of women in the workforce had risen steadily over the preceding decades, 
growing from 34% in 1950 to 45% by 1973.106 As women began to leave the private 
sphere traditionally ascribed to them to enter the public labor market in competition 
with men, traditional gender roles came “under fire.”107 Women were no longer 
simply the homemakers responsible for childcare and housework; rather, by 1975, 
families in which only one parent worked outside the home were no longer the ma-
jority in the United States.108 Consequently, this decade ushered in a new era of two-
career families.  
To enable their entry into the workforce, and particularly into higher paid and 
more prestigious career tracks, women also had to seek higher levels of education. 
Previously, many women had bypassed higher education to focus on finding a hus-
band, or were constrained in their occupational choices if they did seek employ-
ment.109 In this era, however, previously all-male colleges began to admit women 
and more women began to attend college seeking more than just their “M.R.S. de-
gree.” Their numbers continued to increase, and by the 1980s, female enrollment had 
surpassed that of male students.110  
These changes led to “a revolution in attitudes towards” gender roles in the United 
States.111 Increased levels of education in particular influenced both sexes, and espe-
cially women, to reject old norms, making women more likely to choose occupations 
similar to those of their male counterparts.112 With members of both sexes seeking 
higher education and more demanding jobs, both women and men experienced de-
lays in the ages of marriage and childbearing.113 When they did eventually undertake 
these roles, moreover, they began to seek more equitable ways of structuring their 
marriages and families. In these ways, “women’s increasing commitment to educa-
tional opportunities and employment activities and men’s increasing awareness of 
and support for family decisions based on spousal equity”114 transformed the struc-
ture of the American family and led to “an increasing number of marriages in which 
the partners” sought “a balance of fairness.”115 
One important effect of the move toward gender equality was the phenomenon of 
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the dual-career household. Traditionally, although many women worked outside the 
home, husbands had much greater earning capacity, often due to sex segregation in 
the workplace and differential wages for men and women. Moreover, it was socially 
assumed—and legally required—that a husband would support his wife and children. 
The traditional law of marriage was not equal; men and women had very different 
obligations. A man had a duty to support his wife; she had a “reciprocal” duty to 
provide services to him.116 A corollary to these rigid legal roles was the derivative 
domicile rule, whereby a wife’s domicile followed her husband’s.117 This was not 
simply a rule that prescribed domicile for legal purposes—it was also literally a re-
quirement that the wife follow her husband wherever he went.118 If the husband was 
required to support his wife, then he needed to be able to relocate the family without 
his wife’s desires impeding his mobility. And in order to provide services to her hus-
band, a wife needed to be physically present.119 
Gender equality increased the potential for frequent changes in domicile and even 
separate domiciles within marriages and families. Changes in sex roles and family 
structures now “facilate [sic] mobility” for both men and women,120 and both sexes 
now seek educational and career opportunities around the country (and the world). 
Women, and not just men, now “initiat[e] family moves, with husband and children 
following.”121 A legal presumption that wife automatically follows husband no 
longer makes sense.122 
Gender equality also led to couples that choose to live apart. As early as 1974, 
one scholar noted that some two-career families might have to endure “a separation 
in space” when career obligations or opportunities began to pull husbands and wives 
in different directions.123 The example used was a Detroit advertising executive who 
kept an apartment in Detroit “but call[ed] home an early American farmhouse” out-
side of New York City where “[s]he spen[t] every weekend there with her husband 
and two sons.”124 These types of “transhousehold families” show how many modern 
marriages and families have outgrown the idea that a “single law,” linked to a single 
domicile, should “govern” a family’s interests.125  
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B. The Legal Revolution  
Although the Supreme Court declined to hear Mas v. Perry, and thus lost an op-
portunity to hear a derivative domicile case, its docket reflected the more general 
societal transition toward greater gender equality. The cases that the Court decided 
in the early 1970s challenged traditional ideas of men as breadwinners and women 
as homemakers.126 In rejecting these stereotypes on Equal Protection grounds, the 
Court mirrored the ongoing societal shift toward greater gender equality. 
In 1971, around the time the Mases discovered Oliver Perry was spying on them, 
the Court confronted the question of “the constitutionality of sex-based discrimina-
tion.”127 In Reed v. Reed,128 the Court struck down an Idaho statute giving preference 
to men over women in the appointment of estate administrators.129 The Court found 
that the statutory classification had no rational relation to sex and could not be justi-
fied on the basis of administrative convenience.130  
Next, around the same time that Oliver Perry was contesting the trial court’s ju-
risdiction over Judy Mas, the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional a statute that 
allowed male service members to claim their wives as dependents but did not allow 
female service members to do the same for their husbands.131 In Frontiero v. 
Richardson, Justice Brennan’s majority opinion discussed in detail the country’s 
“long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”132 He described the traditional 
“gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes” and the denial to women of many 
civil rights,133 and pointed to ongoing congressional action and labor statistics as 
demonstrating the general effort to eliminate those disparities. In these ways, the 
Supreme Court recognized and furthered the societal changes that were occurring at 
this moment in time.134 
The Fifth Circuit court that ruled on Judy Mas’s domiciliary status during this 
same period was not unaware of these changes in the legal status of gender. In the 
mid-1970s, around the same time that it decided Mas v. Perry, the Fifth Circuit cited 
both Reed and Frontiero in several different cases.135 But, for the most part, the Fifth 
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Circuit attempted to address sex discrimination during the 1970s only in employment 
discrimination cases where it had been specifically pled under Title VII; when plain-
tiffs brought cases involving discrimination based on their family role, the court was 
less sympathetic. Indeed, several of the sex discrimination cases the Supreme Court 
heard during this period arose from challenges to state laws from states within the 
Fifth Circuit, which were particularly slow to adapt to modern gender equality.136 
Thus, it may be no surprise that when confronted with the issues of Mas v. Perry, the 
court did not recognize the implications of these precedents for Judy Mas’s situation 
or for the rule of derivative domicile more generally. Instead, the court clung to an-
tiquated and gendered ideas about the legal unity of man and wife.137  
Indeed, changes in the law’s approach to gender equality did not result in any 
legal reform of the concept of domicile, nor did they make the use of that concept 
any easier. Instead, these changes made domicile an even more difficult principle to 
apply and one that often fails to accurately measure the lives and intentions of mod-
ern families. The rule of derivative domicile remained in effect in most of the United 
States until the late 1980s, despite the efforts of women’s rights activists to overturn 
the rule.138 In the early 1970s, the vast majority of jurisdictions still followed the 
common law presumption, whether conclusive or rebuttable, that the husband “had 
the authority to choose the marital abode” and his wife was “was obliged to fol-
low.”139 Fifteen states allowed women to establish their domicile for voting purposes 
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on the same basis as other adults, but went no further,140 and only a handful of states 
had laws “declaring that the domicile of a person [should] not be denied or abridged 
on the basis of sex.”141  
Neither the Supreme Court nor any other court ever “definitively struck down” 
the rule of derivative domicile, but it largely faded out of use as time went on.142 
Now, although derivative domicile is no longer explicitly invoked in the vast major-
ity of jurisdictions, traces of it continue to reverberate in various areas of the law.143 
These traces reflect the way in which domicile more generally “continues to exem-
plify a regime of domestic relations law from a mostly bygone era” and has “failed 
to keep pace with [the] transformation” of gender roles and family structures.144 In 
this way, the current use of domicile not only continues to carry “gendered bag-
gage,”145 but it also fails to account for the new mobility and ambition of many 
women, whether married or single.  
The increased mobility and “transhousehold” nature of many two-career families 
makes domiciliary intent far more difficult, if not impossible, to measure accurately. 
Both men and women are highly mobile and often have to choose between uprooting 
their families and their spouses’ careers and enduring a period of separation from 
their children and/or spouses. For many families or married couples, therefore, their 
family home is not confined to a single residence, or it may be subject to frequent 
change and relocation. Consequently, imposing a rule of single residence on these 
families is both highly complicated and often inaccurate. Another trend that emerged 
in the 1970s has served to further complicate these inquiries: the new period of iden-
tity formation and exploration for young adults known as “emerging adulthood.”  
III. THE EMERGENCE OF “EMERGING ADULTHOOD” 
Although the gender revolution of the 1960s and 1970s made an immediate im-
pact on American society, the results of another, “quiet[er] revolution for young peo-
ple in American society” have only recently come to the fore of the American con-
sciousness.146 Prior to the sixties and seventies, young people were eager to grow up 
and “settle down.”147 Completing one’s education (if one was a man), marriage, and 
having children were the events that marked the transition from adolescence to adult-
hood. Young adults had a “predictable” pathway towards adulthood, and that status 
of adulthood was clearly defined.148  
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Beginning in the seventies, however, these pathways began to elongate and 
morph, sometimes beyond recognition.149 Even as young people gained greater legal 
and civic responsibilities, it became more difficult to ascertain just what constituted 
adulthood from a social or socioeconomic perspective. These changes resulted in the 
formation of a new stage of life for young adults. Social scientists have labeled this 
period of life “emerging adulthood.”150 The characteristics of emerging adulthood 
further undermine the accuracy and usefulness of domicile, as young people take 
longer to decide where to establish their permanent home and to choose with whom 
they will share it. 
A. Extending the Pathway to Adulthood  
Marriage and parenthood have long served as defining benchmarks of adult-
hood.151 Beginning in the seventies, however, women were no longer confined to 
marriage and the home; rather, they began to pursue higher levels of education and 
careers. Young men also began to attend college and pursue even higher levels of 
education at higher rates, meaning that young people of both genders began spending 
more time pursuing education and careers.152 Between 1963 and 1968, the number 
of students enrolled in colleges and universities increased by 2,400,943 students, the 
largest jump in student enrollment in U.S. history.153 
 Due in large part to this increase in higher education enrollment,154 it began to 
take young adults longer to reach the traditional markers of adulthood. The timing of 
traditional role transitions—such as leaving one’s childhood home and entering the 
workforce—changed. So did the timing of marriage and parenthood.155 In 1950, the 
median age of marriage was twenty for women and twenty-two for men. By 1970, 
there was only a slight rise to twenty-one and twenty-three, but by 2000 the average 
ages stood at twenty-five and twenty-seven, respectively.156 As the timing of these 
markers changed, so did their importance, as young adults began to value other, more 
amorphous markers of adulthood, including financial independence and personal re-
sponsibility, and also began to view marriage and parenthood as “perils to be 
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avoided” until a later age.157 Also, many people declined to marry altogether,158 re-
sulting in the need for new markers of adulthood.159 Unlike prior generations, young 
adults in the seventies faced an extended and often circuitous path to adulthood. This 
new process of attaining adulthood began to significantly undermine the usefulness 
of domicile as a tool for measuring the lives of young adults. As the example of Judy 
Mas shows, many young adults had no “true, fixed, and permanent home.”160 
This long and winding “road to adulthood” has only become more pronounced 
among today’s young adults.161 Reaching adulthood is no longer as simple as turning 
eighteen or even twenty-one, finishing one’s education, and moving away from home 
to get married and start one’s own family.162 Instead, young people now define adult-
hood by more gradual and incremental markers and face significant challenges in 
reaching those signifiers of adulthood. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett has labeled the period 
between the late teens and mid-to-late twenties, or even thirties, as a time of “emerg-
ing adulthood,”163 a term that has gained widespread usage among those who study 
and report on this phenomenon. According to Arnett, this period of life is defined by 
“identity exploration[],” “instability,” “self-focus[],” “in-between[-ness],” and 
“possibilities.”164 
The increase in the number of students who attend college has contributed to these 
delays and difficulties in many ways. The trend of increased higher education has 
only amplified since the seventies, and levels of education continue to rise.165 This 
increase in young people seeking higher education can be attributed at least in part 
to “the massive economic restructuring of the last several decades,” which has “re-
shaped the labor market into an hourglass with little middle ground between the se-
curity afforded by professional careers and the insecurity of low-wage unskilled 
work.”166 Consequently, “young people are incentivized to invest more in accruing 
advanced academic credentials” in order to “push through the bottleneck in this 
hourglass.”167 This phenomenon has created delays in young adults’ entry into the 
workforce. Young adults now take longer to complete bachelor’s degrees than they 
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used to, and about two-thirds of those who do earn a bachelor’s degree plan to attend 
graduate school, meaning their education could last for most of their twenties, if not 
longer.168 When they graduate, however, they often do so with large amounts of debt 
and few employment prospects.169 Today’s emerging adults face higher un-
employment rates than any other age group.170 Moreover, forty million Americans 
now have student loan debt that contributes to the financial difficulties faced by col-
lege graduates, especially as the average amount of student debt per person continues 
to increase rapidly.171 The issue of student debt is even more severe for graduate 
students, who make up only 14% of students in all of higher education but carry 40% 
of the nation’s student debt.172 These educational and financial issues greatly con-
tribute to delayed adulthood, as young adults graduate from college or graduate pro-
grams only to face limited job prospects and large loan payments.  
As a result, many emerging adults return to their parents’ homes after graduating 
or between career moves, hoping to pay off their loans and achieve financial stabil-
ity.173 Many also return home to achieve the freedom to explore new (and often risky 
or low-paying) career directions. As one reporter noted, many young adults “are re-
jecting the Dilbertian goal of a steady, if unsatisfying, job for years of experimenta-
tion, even repeated failure, that eventually leads to a richly satisfying career.”174 For 
young adults seeking a career more suited to their personal passions, living at home 
for a period of time is not “a sign of giving up; it’s an economic plan”175 that reflects 
their generation’s emphasis on self-exploration and authentic identity formation. 
These young adults continue to tie their domiciles to those of their parents for prac-
tical reasons, not because they are still legally incapable of forming intent.  
Economic pressures are only one of the factors contributing to a postponement, 
or abandonment, of traditional markers of adulthood. Before the advent of easily 
accessible contraception and abortion, pregnancy often resulted in marriage and 
parenthood, ending the period of experimentation and discovery experienced by 
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young adults. As Professors Naomi Cahn and June Carbone have explained, for many 
couples, “the improvident pregnancy triggered the assumption of adult responsibili-
ties the couple might have preferred to postpone.”176 Today’s emerging adulthood is 
partly a result of economic distress, but also partly a result of expanded freedom. 
The post-college experience of these “boomerang kids” who return to their homes 
of origin is increasingly common: one 2015 source reports that at least 36% of 
eighteen to thirty-one year olds now live with their parents.177 Although some com-
mentators characterize these young adults as entitled and lazy, others laud their 
choices as “practical, long-term financial move[s].”178 And even those young adults 
who do not move back home often maintain financial ties to their parents. Most 
young adults continue to receive financial support from their parents well into their 
mid twenties, regardless of whether they live with them.179  
This continued parental support can stem from a desire to allow young adults to 
“follow their dreams,” which in turn reflects the open-ended nature of emerging 
adulthood, during which young people spend an extended period of time exploring 
their options for careers, homes, and romantic partners. During this time of explora-
tion and identity formation, emerging adults are unlikely to form permanent attach-
ments to anything, anyone, or any place. They are likely to maintain ties to their 
parents, however, due to the difficulty of achieving financial independence but also 
to the fact that they will likely not form family units of their own for some time.180 
 In addition to financial support and healthcare, moreover, emerging adults fre-
quently rely on their parents’ guidance in life decisions both big and small and often 
feel more emotionally connected with parents than did prior generations.181 This de-
pendency cuts across socioeconomic lines, although it affects different classes in dif-
ferent ways. For the college educated, it is correlated with later age of first marriage, 
as young adults with college degrees seek to become financially self-sufficient before 
marrying—and before having children.182 For young adults from lower socioeco-
nomic classes, who are more likely to have children outside of marriage and at an 
earlier age, it can mean the intensive involvement of their parents in the raising and 
financial support of their own children.183 Many young adults see adulthood as the 
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culmination of a gradual progression away from the traditional markers of depend-
ence, but that process will take significantly longer than it might have in the past.184 
Other characteristics of emerging adulthood further muddle this inquiry. In par-
ticular, the mobility of emerging adults demonstrates that very few twenty-year-olds 
have a permanent intention to reside anywhere. In earlier generations, young adults 
settled into permanent careers immediately or soon after graduating high school or 
college. Now, however, young adults are highly likely to face unemployment and 
uncertainty in their careers.185 If they are lucky enough to be employed, that employ-
ment is often unstable and likely to change. Young adults now change jobs an aver-
age of seven times in their twenties,186 and change their residences even more fre-
quently.187 At the age of eighteen, rates of mobility for young adults increase 
drastically, and they continue to increase until they peak in the midtwenties, meaning 
that young adults “rarely know where they will be living from one year to the 
next.”188 This instability reflects the fact that emerging adults tend to only have a 
vague “plan” for their lives, a plan that “is subject to numerous revisions” as young 
adults explore different career paths in different locations.189  
As a result, even young adults who forego college or have graduated from college 
or graduate school may lack the ability to truly choose a domicile. Imagine a young 
woman from, say, Minnesota, who strikes out on her own in Los Angeles or New 
York City and relies on a monthly check from her Minnesotan parents to make rent. 
She telephones Minnesota most days for life advice from her mother and visits 
Minnesota several times a year, for major holidays. Perhaps her parents still claim 
her as a dependent for income tax purposes. They may even still claim her as a de-
pendent for health insurance purposes. She likely has only a tentative idea of where 
the next few years of her life will take her, in terms of both jobs and locations. It’s 
quite likely that she may move back to Minnesota to live with her parents again, if 
only for a brief period, and it’s just as likely that she could move to several other 
states, or even countries, before forming a “permanent” residence. Many courts today 
would hold that she never abandoned her Minnesota domicile.190 Linking her to her 
parents’ home, however, despite her close financial and emotional ties to her parents, 
likely does not reflect the reality of her present or her future. Her future simply does 
not fit within the framework of domicile, in large part because young adults’ lives no 
longer follow set and well-established paths. 
Emerging adults may have some vague conception of what they want to do and 
where they want to be, but those ideas are amorphous and subject to frequent 
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change—an instability exacerbated by a punishing job market and extensive student 
loan debt.191 Consequently, marshalling the evidence to prove their domiciliary intent 
is difficult, and the rigid confines of domicile fail to capture the amorphous nature of 
their intentions.  
B. Emerging Adulthood and the Law 
The social and legal ages of adulthood diverged in the 1970s, as the legal age of 
majority decreased and the social age of adulthood began to increase. Prior to the 
early seventies, the legal age of majority was almost universally set at twenty-one,192 
a tradition inherited from English common law.193 Some states set the age of majority 
slightly lower for women, reflecting the expectation that they were to marry young, 
while men needed more time to complete their education.194 By the mid-1970s, how-
ever, only Utah and Arkansas still differentiated between men and women in this 
respect,195 and the country was moving toward a lower age of majority for both sexes. 
Political pressures drove most of this change.  
During World War II, Congress lowered the draft age to eighteen.196 This legisla-
tion sparked a push for extending voting rights to eighteen-year-olds. Proponents of 
lowering the voting age argued that if young people were “old enough to fight, [they 
were] old enough to vote.”197 While this initial push had limited success, leading just 
a few states to lower their voting ages, it grew into a nationwide campaign in the late 
sixties and early seventies when young people rallied in opposition to the decidedly 
unpopular Vietnam War.198  
Proponents of lowering the voting age argued that, due to “rising level[s] of edu-
cation,” young people were “better equipped to exercise the right” to vote than were 
previous generations.199 Opponents of this change, however, argued that lowering 
the voting age would lead to “a flood of student votes in university communities,” 
meaning that “temporary residents” with “nothing material at stake” would fail to 
“sober[ly] consider[]” their decisions and would “overwhelm[] the local electors.”200  
These arguments reflect the transitional moment in which they were made as well 
as traditional notions of electoral capacity. Beginning in the 1970s, “expanding 
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mobility and increased affluence” among the American populace contributed to a 
rise not only in the number of young adults seeking higher education, but also in 
those attending colleges in states other than their home state.201 Both men and women 
began to seek more education and, in doing so, became more transient.  
Like the judge in the Mas trial, however, opponents of lowering the voting age 
believed that students could not have any domiciliary intent regarding the place 
where they attended school. This belief mirrored arguments about voter capacity 
made as early as the seventeenth century, when legislators defended property-based 
voter qualifications on the basis that voters should have “a permanent fixed interest” 
in both the nation and their locality.202 Property ownership, the argument went, en-
sured that a voter would have a “personal stake in and knowledge of the community,” 
unlike “transients” that could be “here today, and gone tomorrow.”203 In these ways, 
property status and student status have each served as proxies for domiciliary intent 
and permanent connections (or lack thereof). The changes among the life patterns of 
young adults in the 1970s, however, began to undermine the usefulness of these proxies. 
Despite these arguments against lowering the voting age, the government moved 
to extend voting rights to eighteen-year-olds in anticipation of the 1972 presidential 
election. The 1971 extension of the Voting Rights Act granted voting rights to 
eighteen-year-olds participating in federal elections,204 and the 26th Amendment ex-
tended that provision to state and local elections.205 The new voting age corresponded 
to a new conception of the legal age of majority and the corresponding “rights and 
responsibilities of young people.”206 Across the United States, young people were 
now widely considered legal adults at the age of eighteen.207 
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States were simultaneously lowering the marital age of consent for men. Tradi-
tionally, many states had different rules for marital consent for men and women, with 
a higher age for men, who presumably needed more time to develop a profession to 
support a dependent wife.208 By the 1970s, half of the states had lowered their age of 
marital capacity from twenty-one to eighteen for both sexes.209 Examined in isola-
tion, the reduction of the age of consent would appear to encourage the onset of social 
adulthood, not delay it. For instance, when the age of consent was twenty-one, young 
people could generally marry at an earlier age, provided they had the consent of their 
parents. Moving the age of consent to eighteen, or younger, meant that younger 
adults could choose to marry on their own without approval by their parents.  
But the downward shift in legal adulthood coincided with other legal changes that 
cut in the opposite direction. Women increasingly demanded equal rights and gained 
access to professions that would enable them to be self-sufficient.210 The Supreme 
Court struck down laws banning the sale of contraceptive devices, first to married 
couples,211 and then to single people.212 The Court also declared unconstitutional 
many restrictions on abortion.213 Restrictions on pre- or extramarital sex went un-
enforced,214 and legal disabilities imposed on nonmarital children were invali-
dated.215 Marriage might be available to young men at an earlier age, but that did not 
mean it was desirable or necessary. Once sex outside of marriage was socially and 
legally acceptable, reliable prevention of pregnancy was widely available, and 
women were capable of supporting themselves economically, the entire architecture 
of interdependency that had encouraged early marriage disappeared.216  
As this architecture crumbled, other economic changes—namely, more years of 
more expensive education combined with a shaky job market—further contributed 
to delayed attainment of social adulthood. Recent measures taken by the federal gov-
ernment show that many government representatives recognize the economic chal-
lenges facing emerging adults transitioning to adulthood, at least in the area of 
healthcare. When members of Congress proposed an addition to the Affordable Care 
Act that would allow young adults to stay on their parents’ healthcare plan until age 
twenty-six,217 they focused on the “time of transition and uncertainty” many young 
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adults face during that time period.218 The lawmakers noted the trend of emerging 
adulthood, focusing in particular on the fact that young adults frequently change jobs, 
work in part-time or temporary positions that do not provide healthcare, or lack the 
funds to pay for their own healthcare.219 These issues meant that prior to passage of 
the Affordable Care Act, when young adults were cut off from their parents’ 
healthcare at twenty-one, young people over the age of twenty-one had the highest 
uninsured rate among all U.S. age groups.220 Lack of insurance also exacerbated fi-
nancial issues among the young population by allowing for huge amounts of medical 
debt that affected the repayment of other types of debt, including student loan debt.221 
Various proposals for health-care reform used different ages as the new cutoff 
point—twenty-six,222 twenty-seven,223 and even twenty-nine.224 The range of pro-
posed ages shows the difficulty of defining the age at which true social and legal 
adulthood coincide.225 By allowing young adults to stay dependent on their parents’ 
healthcare, the legislators argued, they were freeing young adults and allowing them 
“a long way down the path of some independence, some liberation to follow their 
[dreams].”226  
In short, the law has struggled to adapt to the reality of emerging adulthood. Just 
as gender equality challenged traditional understandings of married women’s lack of 
capacity to form their own domicile, emerging adulthood challenges the notion that 
young adults have capacity to do so. Both trends were prefigured by Mas, in which 
the appellate court reluctantly declined to apply the derivative domicile rule to its 
full effect and used well-established principles of domicile to craft a new rule that 
tied adult students to their parents and homes. That Mas concerned students was no 
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accident; it was in the realm of student tuition that the tensions over gender equality, 
emerging adulthood, and the limits of domicile came to a head. 
IV. THE BATTLE OVER TUITION 
Before the late 1960s and early 1970s, the American system of higher education 
was “relatively well-ordered.”227 Because young adults were considered minors until 
the age of twenty-one, they retained their parents’ domicile until that age, even when 
attending an out-of-state college or university.228 Even after turning twenty-one, out-
of-state students faced almost insurmountable challenges in overcoming their initial 
classification as nonresidents, largely because they would likely not have time to 
fulfill a durational residency requirement before graduating.229 For female students, 
marriage often ended their education, as they became housewives or worked to put 
their husbands through school.230 
The new age of legal adulthood and the new move toward gender equality, how-
ever, fundamentally altered this system. To many, the “enfranchisement of eighteen 
year olds” signified that eighteen-year-olds were also now capable of forming their 
own domicile.231 As one judge reasoned, the extension of the right to vote to an 
eighteen-year-old ended that individual’s “traditional dependence on his parents, in-
cluding the view that their home is his residence.”232 Consequently, many viewed 
eighteen-year-olds as capable of forming a separate domicile, and many eighteen-
year-olds were willing to do so by traveling to other states to attend college. At the 
same time, courts began to dismantle the architecture of coverture, the law by which 
married women were legally subservient to their husbands, in favor of a “partner-
ship” model of marriage.233 
These changes wreaked havoc on the settled system of tuition setting and univer-
sity financing. In particular, they called into question the usefulness of domicile in 
determining state citizenship for educational purposes. Just as the judges in Mas v. 
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Perry questioned the applicability of the derivative domicile rule to Jean Paul and 
Judy Mas’s marriage and wondered whether a student could obtain a new domicile 
apart from her parents, so did colleges and universities across the country grapple 
with these same issues in a variety of cases. This Part first explores how emerging 
adulthood and gender equality worked together to undermine the educational financ-
ing system and then examines the resulting litigation and the effects it had on tradi-
tional uses of domicile. 
A. A New Standard for Student Residency 
American college students in the 1970s were highly mobile234 and continue to be 
so. Women in particular gained mobility during this period, as traditionally male 
schools opened their doors to students of both genders.235 Although the rates of mi-
gration to public institutions decreased during the seventies, the number of students 
migrating to attend private institutions increased during the same period.236 This dis-
parity reflects the affluence of the students attending those private institutions.237 But 
it also reflects the deterrent effect of barriers put in place by public institutions to 
prevent more budget-conscious students from attending college outside their home 
state, barriers that resulted from another ongoing economic change.238   
Just as more students sought higher levels of education, state systems of higher 
education faced budgetary crises. Public schools responded to their deflating 
budgets, as well as the prospect of eighteen-year-olds with a new potential capacity 
to establish domicile, by restricting the admission of out-of-state students and raising 
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nonresident tuition rates.239 Before 1968, resident and nonresident tuition rates were 
roughly equivalent, but in the late sixties and early seventies, state institutions began 
to raise tuition rates.240 By 1973, the tuition differential between nonresident and 
resident students had nearly doubled,241 in an attempt to “extract more money from 
nonnative students or to discourage their attendance.”242  
As a result, the capacity of eighteen-year-olds to form a domicile separate from 
that of their parents became immensely important. If young adults could prove that 
they were domiciled in a new state upon matriculating at a college there, they would 
only have to pay resident tuition rates. Those young adults would reap substantial 
financial benefits, while the school they were attending would suffer significant fi-
nancial losses. Professor Raymond Carbone predicted that, should these tuition dif-
ferentials disappear, universities would experience potential losses of $250–300 mil-
lion annually.243 Universities paid attention to this legal landscape and to these 
predictions, with some steeply raising tuition for all students in anticipation.244 These 
“doomsday” predictions did not come to fruition, but out-of-state students, as well 
as parents funding their children’s education, “became aware of the relationship be-
tween newfound voter status and the higher tuition” they were charged.245  
Higher education struggled to confront these issues, resulting in an intricate sys-
tem of regulations for tuition classification. The complexity and variety of these clas-
sifications among the states made the world of residency requirements analogous to 
“a keg of fishhooks.”246 Schools heightened their efforts to verify which students 
should actually be classified as residents,247 while students began to find inventive 
ways of establishing residency in the state where their schools were located248 and to 
bring lawsuits when those efforts failed.249 
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Most universities arrived at a solution that incorporated both domicile and resi-
dence into in-state tuition regulations.250 A student would first have to demonstrate 
that he or she was domiciled in a particular state, using the traditional definition of 
domicile. The California Education Code, for example, defined residence as the sin-
gular “place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special 
or temporary purpose, . . . to which he returns in seasons of repose,” and which “can-
not be lost until another is gained.”251 This definition of “residence” matched 
California’s definition of “domicile.”252 One court found that the purpose of the 
Education Code was to ensure that a person “was not temporarily residing within the 
state for the mere purpose of securing the advantages of the university” but rather 
intended to become a permanent resident of the state—thus highlighting the aspect 
of domicile that focuses on long-term intent and not simply residence.253 But the 
California Education Code went one step further beyond merely requiring that those 
seeking in-state tuition demonstrate domicile. Students would also have to demon-
strate that they had been domiciled in California for at least a year prior to their first 
day of classes at the school.254 This rule prevented students from relocating to 
California solely to take advantage of in-state tuition. In order to establish domicile 
in California, they would need to demonstrate the intent to become a permanent resi-
dent, not merely to access in-state tuition. A student who paid out-of-state tuition for 
one year, then, would not become an in-state student during the second year, as no 
domicile (or, in the words of the California statute, “bona fide residen[ce]”255) had 
been established. The California Code further stated that “the residence of the hus-
band is the residence of the wife,” thereby explicitly incorporating the concept of 
derivative domicile, and, as we shall see, opening up ample room for extensive 
litigation.256 
Many other states followed California’s model in their attempts to balance the 
rights of state citizens with the financial needs of universities.257 These were 
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challenged by students who were denied access to in-state tuition, but the Supreme 
Court consistently proved to be unsympathetic towards the students.258  
Residency requirements appeared more vulnerable following the Supreme 
Court’s articulation in Shapiro v. Thompson, of a constitutional right to travel.259 
Shapiro concerned residency requirements that denied welfare assistance to residents 
of states who had not lived in those states for a minimum of one year.260 The Supreme 
Court found the statutes unconstitutional, holding that the “constitutional right to 
travel from one State to another . . . occupies a position fundamental to the concept 
of our Federal Union” and that the statutes abridged this right in violation of equal 
protection.261  
Although Shapiro concerned welfare residency requirements, not tuition resi-
dency requirements, the parallels were clear. The states in Shapiro had argued that 
the purpose of the challenged statutes was to “preserve the fiscal integrity of state 
public assistance programs.”262 This concern, however important, was not sufficient 
to override potential migrants’ constitutional right to travel.263 Shapiro largely insu-
lated universities, however, by inserting a potentially large loophole in a footnote. 
By characterizing the penalty imposed by the state in Shapiro as one that could im-
pair someone’s “ability . . . to obtain the very means to subsist—food, shelter, and 
other necessities of life,”264 the Court implied that less severe penalties might not be 
significant enough to trigger constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, the Court pointedly took 
“no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining 
eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice 
a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth.”265 
This exception proved to be robust in tuition litigation that followed.266 In 1973, 
in Vlandis v. Kline, the Court heard a case concerning a Connecticut statute that cre-
ated an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for state university students whose 
legal addresses were outside Connecticut when they applied for admission.267 The 
Court found the statute to violate due process because it included some bona fide 
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state residents as nonresidents.268 In its opinion, the Court endorsed Connecticut’s 
rewritten law, which incorporated a domicile standard. Rather than looking only at a 
student’s address, the University would also consider his or her “year-round resi-
dence, voter registration, place of filing tax returns, property ownership, driver’s li-
cense, car registration, marital status, vacation employment, etc.”269 This dictum 
opened the door for universities to impose a one-year residency rule so long as the 
“residency” was based on these traditional indicators of domicile. Although the Court 
never directly addressed the issue of durational residency requirements for in-state 
tuition, many lower courts did, uniformly upholding them.270 
Despite an earlier age of majority, then, the new durational residency rules func-
tioned to make it more, not less, difficult for college students to demonstrate inde-
pendence from their parents. Students who moved solely for education could not 
obtain a domicile in their new place of residence—at least not for purposes of the 
most salient aspect of their new state citizenship, in-state tuition. Instead, they re-
tained the domiciles of their parents. This is likely why Oliver Perry’s lawyer ques-
tioned Judy Mas about whether she was paying in-state or out-of-state tuition. If her 
answer had been “in-state,” the implication would have been that she had established 
a domicile separate from that of her parents. 
As the Mas case suggests, the new residency rules had implications far beyond 
the undergraduate years. They applied to anyone, even students in their twenties or 
thirties who were seeking a graduate education. And they applied to married students 
as well. Because of the derivative domicile rule that presumed that a married woman 
took the domicile of her husband, the application of tuition residency requirements 
to married students created the most complex litigation of all. 
B. The Return of Derivative Domicile 
When the Mas v. Perry court analyzed Judy Mas’s domicile, it ran up against two 
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competing principles—the traditional principle that a married woman’s domicile fol-
lowed that of her husband, and the more recent principle established in part by tuition 
residency rules that a person could not establish a domicile merely by going to school 
in a particular state. This same conflict was at the heart of much of the litigation over 
tuition residency rules. These cases reveal just how difficult it is to apply the concept 
of domicile in a world of emerging adulthood, gender neutrality, and interstate mo-
bility. In each of these cases, the courts struggled to maintain the traditional domicile 
rule while accommodating changed gender norms and changed concepts of adult-
hood, ultimately undermining the concept of domicile. 
Clarke v. Redeker,271 an early case out of Iowa, reflects this tension well. In that 
case, a law student contested the University of Iowa’s classification of him as a non-
resident. George Clarke had moved to Iowa from Illinois at age seventeen to attend 
the State University of Iowa (SUI).272 In 1964, three years after his matriculation at 
the school, he married Joan Weaver, a lifetime resident of Iowa, and he continued 
with his education by enrolling at SUI’s law school.273 By the time the litigation 
commenced, despite having lived continuously in Iowa for five years, Clarke was 
still classified as a nonresident student and paying the nonresident tuition fee, which 
was twice that of the resident fee.274 
The Clarkes brought a civil rights action together in federal district court, claiming 
that the state should not be allowed to charge differential tuition rates for resident 
and nonresident students, and also arguing that the Iowa regulations “unreasonably 
discriminate[d] between a nonresident male whose wife is a resident of Iowa and a 
nonresident female whose husband is a resident of Iowa.”275 The Clarkes appeared 
to be arguing in part that Joan Clarke’s rights as a citizen of Iowa were being harmed 
because her marriage to George had not reaped him the same benefits that it would 
have brought a female student who had married a male Iowa resident. Moreover, by 
suing jointly, the couple invoked the same concept of marital unity relied on in Mas 
v. Perry, seemingly arguing for a kind of reverse or equivalent derivative domicile 
rule in which a husband’s domicile could follow that of his wife.276 
 Because this case occurred before the 1972 changes in the voting age and age of 
majority, the applicable Iowa regulations split students into two categories: minor 
students and those twenty-one and over.277 Students under the age of twenty-one re-
tained their parents’ domicile, and could apply to change their initial classification 
as nonresidents if their parents moved to Iowa while they were students.278 For those 
twenty-one or older, the state had a durational bona fide residence requirement, but 
bona fide residence meant “that the student is not in the state primarily to attend a 
college; that he is in the state for purposes other than to attempt to qualify for 
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residence status.”279 Because George had initially come to Iowa as a minor student 
and had remained a student once he turned twenty-one, he was unable to establish 
bona fide residence in the state unless he stopped being a student for at least a year 
and demonstrated that he was in Iowa for a reason other than obtaining in-state 
residency.  
Had George been a woman married to a male Iowan, however, things would have 
been different. The Iowa regulation explicitly incorporated the derivative domicile 
rule, stating that, because “[t]he residence of a wife is that of her husband,” non-
resident female students could attain Iowan residency through marriage to an Iowan, 
while a resident female student could lose her residence if she married a non-
resident.280 The court showed no qualms in upholding this rule, reasoning that it 
simply “adhere[d] to the well established legal concept that the domicile of a wife is 
the same as that of her husband.”281  
The court did, however, qualify its endorsement of the derivative domicile rule. 
It emphasized that the regulation was just a “guideline for the possible re-
classification of [a] female student,” and that marriage to a female resident could still 
be a factor considered in reclassifying a male nonresident.282 Moreover, the court 
ruled that Clarke had shown a “substantial basis” for reclassification as a resident, 
and that the school had applied its regulations too rigidly, although the court did not 
explain what constituted that “substantial basis.”283 In the absence of other discussion 
by the court, the Clarkes’ marriage appears to be the primary reason that George 
could be deemed an Iowan.284  
This case, then, might reflect a new willingness to rework some of the old precepts 
of domicile. Under a strict derivative domicile rule, Joan Clarke would have lost her 
own individual Iowa domicile upon her marriage to George. Moreover, if she had 
been a student at the time of her marriage, she could have lost her status for in-state 
tuition purposes as well. Although the Clarke court explicitly referenced the “well 
established legal concept” of derivative domicile, however, it still treated Joan as an 
Iowa domiciliary; moreover, her domicile appeared to be a primary factor in deter-
mining that of George. As a result, although the case in some ways reflects the tradi-
tional precepts of gender and domicile that were still in place at the time of Mas v. 
Perry, it also hints at some of the changes beginning to occur during that time period. 
Clarke signifies the beginning of a wave of tuition-related litigation that peaked 
in the early seventies. After Shapiro v. Thomas was decided,285 even more out-of-
state students sought to overturn residency classifications, and many of these cases 
were complicated by the derivative domicile rule. Just a month after Shapiro was 
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decided, a California Court of Appeals upheld the tuition differential and durational 
residency requirements imposed by the University of California Board of Regents.286 
Kirk v. Board of Regents, like Clarke v. Redeker, involved the nonresident spouse of 
a state resident seeking reclassification for tuition purposes. This time, however, their 
genders were reversed. In July 1967, Deborah Kirk, a resident of Ohio, married 
Charles Kirk, an attorney who had only become a California resident in 1966.287 The 
couple moved to Berkeley and that fall, Deborah enrolled at the University of 
California, at which time she was classified as a nonresident student.288 
California law required a person to have been domiciled in California for a year 
before becoming a resident for tuition purposes. Under the statute, Deborah Kirk had 
become domiciled in California by operation of law upon her marriage to Charles.289 
She argued that, because Charles had resided in the state for thirteen months prior to 
their marriage, she should be able to count that time towards fulfilling the one-year 
residency requirement. She further contended that she should be treated the same 
way as minor students, since her domiciliary status was also derivative.290 
Accordingly, Deborah sought to use the traditional concept of derivative domicile to 
her own benefit. 
The court, however, rejected this effort, though without rejecting the authority of 
the derivative domicile rule. The court ruled that Deborah had become a resident of 
California on the date of her marriage.291 It then refused, however, to allow her to 
“retroactive[ly] ‘tack[]’” her husband’s time of residence onto her own.292 The court 
cited no precedent and gave little to no explanation, instead stating that Deborah had 
not shown that such tacking had previously been permitted.  
This ruling, however, contradicted the stated purpose of the Education Code and 
of the derivative domicile rule that the court unquestioningly upheld. If the Education 
Code’s residency requirements were meant to ensure that an individual was not in 
the state solely to obtain an education, Deborah satisfied that condition, as she moved 
to California primarily to reside with her husband. He had been employed in 
California and a member of the State Bar for a year, so she moved to the state in 
which he had chosen to reside for the indefinite future. In fact, when Deborah argued 
that the requirement exerted a “chilling effect” on her fundamental right to interstate 
travel,293 the court rejected her argument, characterizing it as an absurd suggestion 
that “persons like herself who contemplate marriage and interstate changes of resi-
dence to accompany their spouses, take into account that . . . they will have to pay 
the higher nonresident tuition fee at publicly finance[d] institutions for a maximum 
period of one year.294 
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In this way, the court acknowledged that Deborah was not moving to the state 
solely for the reason of obtaining education, but rather was following her husband. 
Ignoring these facts undermined the court’s asserted adherence to the derivative 
domicile rule, a rule that was meant to reflect the legal unity of the married couple. 
Instead, the court placed the onus on Deborah to independently fulfill her durational 
residency requirement, while simultaneously establishing a presumption in her favor 
that she would be a full resident for tuition purposes a year after her marriage. In this 
way, like the court in Clarke, the Kirk court seemingly upheld the derivative domicile 
rule while undermining it.  
Other courts similarly insisted on applying the derivative domicile rule, even 
where it led to absurd results. One court even held that two women who had moved 
to Colorado to join their student husbands were eligible for in-state tuition but their 
husbands were not.295 The state regulation stated that “[u]nless the contrary appears 
to be true to the satisfaction of the [registrar] . . . it shall be presumed that . . . the 
domicile of a married woman is normally that of her husband.”296 This led the 
University of Colorado registrar to presume that the women had the same domicile 
as their husbands and to classify them as nonresidents as well.297  
The Colorado court rejected that classification decision, but did not overturn the 
state’s use of the derivative domicile rule. Instead, the court found that the school 
had applied the incorrect definition of domicile.298 According to the court, the state 
regulation referred to the broader conception of domicile: “a person’s true, fixed, and 
permanent home and place of habitation,”299 as opposed to a more narrow version 
that would apply only with respect to tuition requirements. The court deemed it “un-
contested” that both the female plaintiffs and their husbands met the broader, tradi-
tional definition; in fact, the court found that both husbands had established Colorado 
domiciles “for all purposes except for tuition purposes.”300  
In this way, the court, rather than taking the opportunity to find that the female 
plaintiffs were capable of establishing their own domicile, maintained the doctrine 
of derivative domicile. In doing so, however, the court reached an odd result. The 
women were eligible for in-state tuition, but their husbands were not, despite their 
supposed legal unity. Accordingly, another court undermined the purpose of the de-
rivative domicile rule by applying it, and further failed to recognize the new reality 
of women’s lives.  
In this vein, most courts during this period refused to consider abolishing the de-
rivative domicile rule, instead bending over backwards to retain it while undermining 
its rationale. A notable exception was the decision in Samuel v. University of 
Pittsburgh, which affirmatively discarded the rule’s application in the tuition context 
as violating equal protection.301  
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Confusion over domiciliary intent has only increased in the last three decades. In 
the more recent cases, courts have begun to call into question the legitimacy of one-
year residency rules for domiciliaries, reinforcing the notion that intent to reside per-
manently is more important than the length of residence. Simultaneously, courts have 
recommitted to a modern form of the derivative domicile rule, in which marriage—
for men and women—is often the deciding factor in determining a person’s domicile. 
Both of these trends are likely to exacerbate, not solve, problems with eligibility for 
in-state tuition, as they ask universities and courts to search for intent that simply 
may not exist. 
Consider, for example, the 1994 case of Eastman v. University of Michigan.302 
The plaintiffs in Eastman were an apt example of the changes wrought by gender 
equality and the rise of emerging adulthood. Susan Eastman, originally a resident of 
Pennsylvania, married a Nebraska resident.303 She had attended the University of 
Michigan for two years before moving to California with her husband. After seven 
years in California, which included a brief interlude in New York, the couple decided 
to return to Michigan, because Mr. Eastman had received a job offer from a law firm 
there. Before leaving California, Susan applied to the University of Michigan and 
was “readmitted” as a nonresident student for the 1990 winter term.304 She then ap-
plied for a reclassification as a Michigan resident for the fall 1990 term and was 
denied.305  
Susan Eastman sued the University, arguing that the Michigan Regulation vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause. The Michigan Regulation governing residence ex-
pressly presumed that students normally came to the University “for the primary or 
sole purpose of attending the University rather than to establish a domicile in 
Michigan,”306 and therefore required a student to prove that she had been domiciled 
in Michigan and resided there continuously for the year before her enrollment or 
attempted reclassification. 
When the case reached the Sixth Circuit, the court reaffirmed the importance of 
domicile to state citizenship. It explained that “[b]ecause domicile can be obtained 
without the passage of any particular period of time,” imposing a durational require-
ment on a bona fide domiciliary would undermine the state’s purported interest in 
providing subsidized tuition to its domiciliaries.307 Therefore, the court held, time 
spent in the state could be relevant to show domicile, but it was not dispositive.308 
Because an individual could instantly form a new domicile in the state, the passage 
of time could only serve as one factor among many. Accordingly, the state could not 
simply impose a one-year residency requirement on anyone coming from out of state 
without also examining other factors that might indicate their domiciliary intent. If, 
taking all factors into consideration, the registrar found that the student was not domi-
ciled in the state, he could make the student wait to reapply, but not an entire year. 
Instead, the registrar had to “be open to a new decision if information arose between 
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the initial application and the expiration of one year.”309 In this way, the court ap-
peared to open the registrar’s office to ongoing consideration of every nonresident 
student’s domicile.  
Moreover, by remanding to determine whether Susan Eastman should have been 
deemed a domiciliary of Michigan at the time of her initial application, the court 
acknowledged that, despite her mobility, Susan could have formed a domicile in 
Michigan simply upon moving there. That implication directly contradicts the find-
ings of many earlier courts confronted with the question of student domicile and was 
ultimately contradicted by the events that occurred after Susan’s graduation from the 
University, at which point she and her husband left Michigan once again.310 This 
aspect of their case parallels the situation of the Mases, who were living in Illinois 
by the time their case went to trial, returning to Louisiana, and unsure where they 
were going next. The court’s willingness to accommodate Susan’s mobility under-
mines domicile’s emphasis on permanency while also exposing the inapplicability 
of “permanent intent” to today’s “emerging adults.”311 
Although the Eastman case involved a married couple, the opinion was unclear 
what weight the marriage carried; however, it is likely that without her husband’s 
employment, Susan Eastman would have had a much harder time demonstrating that 
she was domiciled in Michigan. A more recent case makes this distinction more 
baldly. Bergmann v. Board of Regents involved multiple plaintiffs who sued the 
University of Maryland over a regulation that limited in-state tuition to students who 
could demonstrate that they were not in Maryland for the primary purpose of attend-
ing school.312 If a student resided in another state at the time of his application and 
could not prove that he received less than one-half of his financial support from an-
other person while “self-generating” the other half of his income, he was presumed 
to be in the state primarily for an education.313  
Two of the Bergmann plaintiffs were treated very differently by the University. 
Karyn Bergmann, a thirty-six-year-old law student who resided in Virginia at the 
time she applied to law school, was financially independent but relied on loans and 
grants to pay more than half of her tuition, and was therefore found to be an out-of-
state student. Similarly, Lance Pietropola, a dental student from Pennsylvania, was 
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initially denied in-state status when he first enrolled in dental school, and was denied 
again after his second year of school because his financial support came almost en-
tirely from state and federal loans.314 By his third year, however, he had married a 
Maryland resident. The school reclassified him as a resident for tuition purposes.315 
The court upheld the school’s policy on the grounds that the income-based pre-
sumption was rebuttable.316 The presumption, however, was only rebuttable for the 
student who was able to marry a Maryland resident. The court acknowledged that the 
other plaintiffs denied in-state residency satisfied the traditional domicile factors, but 
stated that there were “special circumstances . . . justify[ing] adjustment of th[o]se 
traditional factors”317—namely, the plaintiffs’ student status, which demonstrated 
that they “may well intend to leave the State after graduation” and had a “financial 
incentive” to meet domicile requirements, which justified more intensive scrutiny of 
their applications.  
Moreover, the court argued that as students, the plaintiffs would remain linked to 
their prior domiciles for the time that they remained students—unless, of course, they 
could find an employed Maryland resident to marry. The court stated that the state’s 
“presumption impose[d] no more burden on a student than traditional domicile law,” 
which provides that “once domicile is established, there is a presumption that it con-
tinues until superseded by new domicile.”318 The court had earlier stated that the 
students satisfied the traditional domicile requirements, however, meaning that it was 
either contradicting itself or, more likely, believed that the plaintiffs’ student status 
strengthened the presumption that they had retained their previous domicile. Accord-
ingly, despite the doctrinal tensions caused by the ongoing changes in gender roles 
and social adulthood, the derivative domicile rule lives on.  
The litigation over in-state tuition is unlikely to dissipate, as tuition differentials 
and student debt continue to rise,319 making tuition residency distinctions a source of 
both stress and litigation. Students are still highly migratory, even more so than in 
the seventies.320 As the “very concept of distance has changed,” the “traditional bor-
ders on the enrollment map continue to erode,” and students are willing to attend 
schools across the country.321 Meanwhile, public universities are continually 
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strapped for cash and see out-of-state students, and the higher tuition they pay, as a 
means of funding their activities.322  
Students still work to demonstrate that they have formed a domicile in the state 
where they choose to pursue higher education, and some have discovered the “mar-
riage loophole” that the revised derivative domicile rule provides. Although Lance 
Pietrepola, the Bergmann plaintiff, appears to have married for love, others take a 
more pragmatic approach to marriage, using it to demonstrate their financial inde-
pendence from their parents and thereby obtain in-state residency. For instance, cur-
rent students seeking resident classification in the University of California school 
system must be able to show physical presence, intent to stay, and financial inde-
pendence.323 Undergraduate students over the age of twenty-four are automatically 
deemed financially independent, perhaps reflecting that the state views adulthood as 
a status that is largely achieved by twenty-four.324 Younger students, however, have 
much more difficulty proving financial independence—unless they get married. The 
state views marriage as an automatic means of showing financial independence. For 
this reason, some students in the University of California system have chosen to 
marry complete strangers simply to demonstrate their financial independence, plan-
ning to then divorce them after graduation.325  
The litigation over in-state tuition highlights the ways in which trends of gender 
equality and emerging adulthood, beginning in the 1970s and stretching into the pre-
sent day, have rendered domicile a clumsy and often useless tool. In spite of these 
changes, courts have maintained an antiquated view of the relevance of both mar-
riage and student status. Most young adults, whether they are students or not, are 
largely incapable of forming permanent or indefinite intentions of residency, but they 
also do not intend to permanently reside in their home state. The doctrine of domicile, 
however, cannot grapple with this new reality. Instead, it is used by schools and by 
courts inconsistently, inequitably, and inaccurately to measure, and thus define, the 
lives of young adults—lives that they themselves have not defined and will not define 
for years to come.  
CONCLUSION 
When Judy and Jean Paul Mas sued Oliver Perry, they probably had no idea that 
their case was emblematic of a change in the social fabric that had far-reaching legal 
consequences. If there was anything about their case that seemed revolutionary, it 
was likely the application of tort law to a case involving the widespread availability 
of a “new technology”—the two-way mirror. But the lawyer’s arguments in the case, 
as well as the trial court’s and appeals court’s convoluted reasoning, reveal just how 
difficult it was to apply traditional notions of domicile to a young, married, student 
couple in an age of gender equality and emerging adulthood. As this Article has 
shown through its analysis of in-state tuition litigation, the rule of domicile and the 
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lived reality of the people who must demonstrate it have only become more discon-
nected over time.  
Moreover, the difficulties inherent in measuring domiciliary intent in an age of 
delayed adulthood and increased gender equity may prevent courts from reaching 
consistent results in jurisdictional disputes. This is particularly so when antiquated 
notions of female and student capacity to form domiciliary intent continue to influ-
ence these determinations. The Judy Mases of the world are repeatedly linked to the 
interests and domiciles of their husbands, regardless of their actual intent—or their 
present inability to form one.  
In particular, today’s young adults exist in a kind of no-man’s-land with respect 
to domicile. As they explore the options in front of them during college or after 
graduation, they lack the desire to permanently return to their parental home (even if 
they must do so temporarily), but they may also be incapable of forming the intent 
to reside indefinitely elsewhere. They may form a series of intentions to reside tem-
porarily in a series of locations, but each with the hope that they relocate at some 
date in the future.326 In the intervening period, however, their domicile is left to the 
definition of the courts. They will either be linked to a home they no longer consider 
theirs, or denied the ability to establish a new home due to the amorphous nature of 
their lives.  
Clearly, the life experiences of emerging adults are not a sufficient excuse, stand-
ing alone, to rewrite age-old jurisdictional doctrine. Emerging adults, however, are 
but one example of the difficulties with using a concept that assumes that most peo-
ple’s lives have a sense of permanence they no longer have. As one leading civil 
procedure treatise puts it, “most of us do not jump up one day and cry out, ‘I have 
formed the intent to make this state my permanent home!’”327 This Article has con-
tributed to the mounting evidence that domicile is no longer a concept that effectively 
functions as a proxy for state citizenship.  
For example, Susan Appleton has argued the increasing number of transhousehold 
families, including “LATs” (couples “Living Apart Together”) challenges the notion 
that a person must have only one domicile at a time.328 Similarly, children of di-
vorced, cocustodial parents may very well live in two households in two different 
jurisdictions,329  neither of which fully represents their “permanent home.” Homeless 
people lack a domicile, as do those fleeing natural disaster.330 And strict adherence 
to domicile in jurisdiction over divorce actions resulted in an untenable situation for 
many same-sex couples; unable to obtain domicile in a state that recognizes their 
marriage, they were what Mary Pat Byrn and Morgan L. Holcomb dubbed “wed-
locked.”331 The federal government’s response to United States v. Windsor, in which 
the Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, provides another ex-
ample. Agencies had to determine whether to use domicile to decide which state’s 
law to apply or instead the state where a couple’s marriage was celebrated—and they 
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largely chose the latter, perhaps for convenience but also in recognition of modern 
mobility and the incongruity of having one’s civil rights “flicker” on and off as one 
crosses state lines.332 Professor Susan Appleton thus concludes: “domicile has stalled 
. . . [it] remains a fusty, ossified concept that has been so taken for granted that we 
frequently forget about it.”333 
Indeed, in legal areas outside jurisdictional rules, states have abandoned domicile 
as the operative test. For example, to determine where someone has voting rights or 
should pay state income tax, state law has increasingly look to actual residence rather 
than the intent to reside.334 It makes sense that as law has become increasingly ad-
ministrative and less court-focused, that states would need tests that can be applied 
simply with paper documentation, rather than with testimony about mental states.  
Courts, however, still use domicile as the test for determining jurisdiction. To a 
large extent, these tests are a sham: Nevada’s six-week residency rule for jurisdiction 
over divorce cases,335 for example, is a poor proxy for domicile, and in any case is 
routinely flouted by litigants who pay for affidavits attesting that they have been 
“seen” in the state for six weeks prior to filing the action. But in federal court, domi-
cile still provides the means for obtaining diversity jurisdiction. We believe it is time 
to rethink this. The commonly cited purpose for requiring diversity in federal cases 
that do not involve federal questions of law is the protection of outsiders. A state 
court—in which the judge might be elected and beholden to local interest—might 
discriminate against an out-of-state litigant.336 But just as domicile was a poor proxy 
in Mas v. Perry for the various litigants’ connection to Louisiana, it could be a poor 
proxy in many other types of cases as well.337 Surely whether Judy Mas had the intent 
to remain indefinitely in Louisiana would not affect whether a local judge or jury 
would be biased against her. Her status as a recent arrival, or as the wife of a for-
eigner, would be more likely to cause discrimination.338  
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 Mas v. Perry, often explained as a case that ended the era of derivative domicile, 
is better read as heralding the dawn of a new era. The simultaneous rise of gender 
equality and emerging adulthood has transformed the way in which millions of 
Americans conduct their lives. Legal doctrines must adapt to keep pace with social 
reality. 
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